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ANALOGY AND PRECEDENT IN THE COMMON LAW 
AND THE CIVIL LAW: OUTSTANDING FEATURES 
AND TERMINOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES
Romanenko D.I., Dekhnich O.V.
The article is devoted to the research of comparing terminological and 
meaning differences between such legal institutes as analogy and precedent 
in both the Common Law and the Civil Law systems. The applicability of this 
theme is proved by importance of comparative research in order to shows that 
mindful of differences between separate systems, we can nevertheless find some 
common features. Despite Common Law was built on precedent and Civil Law 
on statutes, in modern times the statutes play more significant role in Common 
Law and case law influences on Civil Law jurisdiction. 
The primary goal of this study is a research of outstanding features, the 
similarities and differences both institutes analogy and precedent in the sepa-
rate systems.
Research results can be used in the comparative legal studies and cross-lin-
guistic researches and also when applying analogy and precedent especially in 
the area of comparative law.
Keywords: the Common Law legal system; the Civil Law legal system; 
analogy; analogia legis; analogia iuris; precedent; legal reasoning; justifica-
tion; arguments; legal gap. 
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АНАЛОГИЯ И ПРЕЦЕДЕНТ                                              
В СИСТЕМАХ ОБЩЕГО И КОНТИНЕНТАЛЬНОГО     
ПРАВА: КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ ОСОБЕННОСТИ                                     
И ТЕРМИНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ РАЗЛИЧИЯ
Романенко Д.И., Дехнич О.В.
Статья посвящена сравнительному исследованию институтов пре-
цедента и аналогии в англо-американском и континентальном праве. 
Объектом изучения являются терминологические, лексические и се-
мантические особенности институтов прецедента и аналогии в общем 
и романо-германском праве. 
Как отмечается авторами, главной особенностью языка юриспру-
денции является высокая степень абстракции юридических терми-
нов, широкая возможность интерпретации и толкования. Несмотря 
на взаимопроникновение систем общего и континентального права, 
сглаживание границ между правовыми отраслями, терминологи-
ческие различия между институтами остаются существенными. 
Поскольку право выполняет важную социальную функцию, термино-
логические ошибки в юридическом тексте должны быть сведены к 
минимуму. Правильное определение значения термина с учетом осо-
бенностей правовой системы необходимо в любой сфере юриспруден-
ции, что обусловливает актуальность и прикладной характер темы 
исследования.
Научная новизна работы состоит в разработке авторами класси-
фикации терминологических особенностей институтов прецедента и 
аналогии в общем и континентальном праве. 
Полученные результаты могут быть использованы в сравнитель-
ных юридических и лингвистических исследованиях. При применении 
институтов аналогии и прецедента, в особенности в сфере сравни-
тельного права.
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Introduction
Arguments from analogy and precedent are two basic forms of reason-
ing in many legal systems, especially the Common Law and the Civil Law 
(Romanic-Germanic Law, Continental Civil Law) systems, that cover more 
than half of the world. In general terms analogy in legal reasoning involves 
an earlier decision being followed in a later case because the later case is 
similar to the earlier one. In contraposition to analogy, precedent involves 
an earlier decision being followed in a later case because both cases are the 
same. However the institutes of precedent and analogy have terminology 
differences in both the Common Law and the Civil Law that is the point at 
issue in this paper.
In broad terms legal reasoning is the particular method of arguing used 
when applying legal rules to particular interactions among legal persons. Ar-
guments from precedent and analogy are an integral part of legal reasoning. 
Legal reasoning differs in a number of ways from the ordinary reasoning used 
by individuals.It often uses arguments that individuals do not employ, or that 
individuals employ in different ways. The main difference between legal rea-
soning and ordinary reasoning is following. In individual reasoning we do not 
normally regard the fact that we decided one way in the past as raising some 
presumption that we should decide the same way in the future. As for legal 
reasoning both the Common Law and the Romanic-Germanic Law systems 
contain different approach to enforcement of law.
The basic legal reasoning approach in the Common Law is this: since courts 
are bound to apply the law, and since earlier decisions have practical authority 
over the content of the law, later courts are bound to follow the decisions of 
earlier cases. This is commonly known as the doctrine of precedent, or stare 
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decisis. Whereas analogy are used when the facts of a case do not fall within 
any precedent in order to assimilate the result to that in the analogical case. 
Another legal reasoning approach is typical for the Civil Law that is much 
different from the Common Law one.
In the Civil Law system earlier decisions are, officially, treated in just this 
way: cases are cited to courts, but courts may only justify their decisions by 
reference to other legal materials such as legislation. As a consequence the 
decision in an earlier case is not in itself regarded as a justification for reaching 
a decision in a later case. Doctrine of precedents does not work in the Civil 
Law the same way like in the Common Law. When the decision maker finds a 
legal gap, in other words cannot applies legislation and when the facts of the 
case do not fall within the legislation, analogy may be a solution. There are 
both legislation and principles that may be applied by analogy in the Civil Law 
for the purpose of adoption the result inthe case at hand to the analogical case.
In this way precedent and analogy terminological and meaning differences 
in the Common Law and the Civil Law must be taken into account when ap-
plying such institutes especially in the area of comparative law.
Objective
The research objective is comparing terminological and meaning differenc-
es as well as the outstanding featuresboth legal institutes analogy and prece-
dent in the Common Law and the Civil Law systems. 
Materials and research methods
The source base of the research is collection of legislation, including for-
eign and domestic legislation, case law, international private law, comparative 
law and underlying law principles. The numerous group of sources is the legal 
doctrine of the Common Law and the Romanic-Germanic Law. The method 
used in the research is the method of complex linguistic description, including 
generalization, comparison and classification. The research is executed in a 
problem and comparative key with application of the general scientific and 
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the specific scientific methods. The work is based on the modern and classical 
methodological principles of research: the structural functional method, princi-
ples of historicism and objectivity. The research methodology includes general 
philosofical methods: analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction and analogy.
The research results and their discussion
In broad terms a precedent is the decision of a court (or other adjudicative 
body) that has a special legal significance. That significance often depends on 
the legal system and intrinsic legal sources. For that reason a court’s decision 
being regarded as having practical or just theoretical authority over the content 
of the law.
1. The term ‘precedent’ in the Common Law system. As noted above the 
doctrine of precedent (stare decisis) is widely spread in the Common Law 
system. It means that the decisions of the Common Law courts have exactly 
practical authority. The legal reasoning by stare decisis varies from one legal 
system to another. It is common for courts lower in a judicial hierarchy to be 
strictly bound by the decisions of higher courts. So that the English Court of 
Appeal is bound by decisions of the House of Lords, and Federal Court judges 
in the United States are bound by decisions of the Federal Court of Appeals. 
The lower court is ‘strictly’ bound because it has no power to overrule the 
higher court’s decision. Finally, courts are generally not bound by the deci-
sions of lower courts: the House of Lords for example is not bound to follow 
decisions of the Court of Appeal and is free to overrule such decisions if it 
takes a different view of how the case should have been decided.
In Common Law system the term precedent may be regarded as (a) laying 
down rules, as (b) the application of underlying principles, and as (c) a deci-
sion on the balance of reasons.
On the first approach precedents consider as laying down rules which later 
courts are then bound to apply to the facts before them [18, p. 38; 15, pp. 82–
86; 9, pp. 1–64; 19, pp. 469–471; 20, pp. 174–187]. In favour of this interpre-
tation of precedent is the distinction drawn in legal practice between what is 
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reffered to as the ‘ratio decidendi’ of a case and ‘obiter dicta’. The ratio of a 
case is the proposition of law that represents the aspect (part) of the case that 
is binding on later courts. In contraposition to the ratio, obiter dicta represents 
other statements and views expressed in the judgment which are not binding 
on later courts. On this view of precedent, the rule laid down in the earlier case 
is represented by the ratio.
There are a range of criticisms of the rule-making account of precedent [16, 
pp. 185–187] that is embodied in two issues: (a) the form in which judgments 
are presented, and (b) the practice of distinguishing.
It is widely accepted that the decision is a marked contrast with statutes, 
where a canonical formulation of the legal rule being laid down is provided.
However, although there is a contrast with legislation here, it can be ex-
aggerated. In both situations the propositions of law for which a case or 
statutory provision is authority must be derived from the case or statute and 
is not identical with the text of either. The real difference between statutes 
and precedent is what in the case of statutes legal systems have elaborate 
conventions of interpretation to assist in the process of deriving the law from 
a legislative text, whereas in the case of precedents they do not. It is merely 
shows that the law derived from precedents may be general and more vague 
than that derived from statutes.Thus it does not establish that precedents do 
not laying down rules.
An integral part of legal reasoning using precedents is the practice of distin-
guishing. Distinguishing contains a precedent not being followed even though 
the facts of the later case fall within the scope of the ratio of the earlier case. If 
the later case falls within the scope of the earlier ratio, it may be assumed that 
the decision in the later case must be the same. In legal reasoning using prece-
dents, the later court may not to follow the earlier case by pointing to some 
difference in the facts between the two cases.
The result of distinguishingis that the later court is free not to follow a prec-
edent that applies to it, by making a ruling which is narrower than that made in 
the precedent case. But the later court has following formal constraints: (a) in 
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creating the ratio of the later case, the circumstances in the ratio of the earlier 
case must be retained, and (b) the ruling in the later case must support the re-
sult reached in the precedent case. In short, the ruling in the second case must 
not be inconsistent with the result in the precedent case, but the court is other-
wise free to make a ruling narrower than that in the precedent. Hence the more 
accurate statements of the doctrine of precedent are to the effect that a later 
court must either follow or distinguish a binding precedent [13, pp. 161–183; 
14, pp. 117–124; 10, pp. 60–65; 12, pp. 51–54].
One of the outstanding features of distinguishing is that it cuts across the 
normal justifications for having rules, namely to have a class of cases treated 
in a certain way despite individual variation between them, with transparency 
in the decision-making process. Instead, the later court is free to avoid the 
result indicated by the earlier ratio so long as it can find some difference in 
facts between the two cases that narrows the earlier ratio while still supporting 
the result in the earlier case. What is more, this power is not merely given to 
courts of the same level of authority as the one laying down the precedent, but 
is given to every court lower in the judicial hierarchy. So on the rule-making 
view of precedent lower courts have the power to narrow the rules laid down 
by higher courts, just it is necessarily to support the result reached in the earlier 
case [21, pp. 168–169].
The application of underlying principles plays significant role in legal 
reasoning by precedent. Actually, the ‘underlying principles’ lead to three 
major difficulties: (a) the scope of distinguishing; (b) accounting for the role 
played by rationes; and (c) keep the distinction between precedent and ana-
logy. Any good argument can provide the basis for distinguishing. For in-
stance, the novel facts in the later case provide considerations that outweigh 
the original justification. It is not that the original justification is inapplicable 
to the novel facts, it is merely that those facts raise additional considerations 
that are more compelling. So later courts go beyond what was done in the 
earlier decision. Abandoning the idea that later courts always are bound to 
follow the decisions of earlier cases is one possible line of response to these 
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difficulties. But where the circumstances of the case at hand do not fall exact-
ly within the ratio of any precedentthe court is free to make a ruling narrower 
than that in the precedent. In that cases what is binding in law is the set of 
principles which best fit and justify the totality of the results in past decisions 
[11, pp. 110–123; 17, pp. 235, 239]. 
2. The term ‘precedent’ in the Civil Law system.It is obvious that in legal 
systems based on the Civil Law tradition, precedent is not formally recognized 
as a source of law, and the doctrine of stare decisis is not supported. In many 
Civilian legal systems, such as Russia, the official view is that court decisions 
do not make law, they just involve the application of the law. This is because 
of the separation of powers. Actually, the responsibility of the legislator is 
to make law, the responsibility of the judiciary is to apply the law made by 
the legislator. For the courts to make law would be to usurp the legislative 
function. When considering precedent, courts may merely take into accountthe 
prior decisions as interpretations of the law, and the courts are often free to 
decide consistently with the prior court’s decision or reject the prior decision.
In practice even the Civil Law system cannot function completely with-
out case law. The decisions of the courts playing at least a concurrentrole in 
settling the content of the law. This conception is embodied in the doctrine of 
jurisprudence constante when a long series of previous decisions applying a 
particular rule of law and may be determinative in subsequent cases. 
For instance, in France the law of torts and delicts is based on only five 
articles of the Code Civil (§§ 1382–1386). It is obvious that this articles can-
not cover completely all possible situations that may arise in the future in the 
event of litigation. Formally, the law is found in those five articles, and a court 
decision is legally flawed if it does not applying that articles in legal reasoning 
as the basic for its decisions. But there are a lot of interpreting and applying 
those articles that helps judges in reaching them decisions. It is nothing short 
of so-called ‘informal making law’. 
Take another example. Russia is a ‘Civil Law jurisdiction’, which means 
that precedent is not an official source of law in Russia. Despite the fact that 
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precedent is not a legal source the following tendency exists. In general, lower 
Russian courts try to follow the principles established by the higher courts. 
This is tradition originates from Soviet jurisprudence when higher courts often 
give the guidelines to the lower courts. Nowadays, the role which the Supreme 
Russian courts play in the law-making process cannot be overemphasized. 
Moreover, even Russian legislation contains some premises of consideration 
precedent as one of the sources of law that have limited legal force. Provisions 
of the Article 308.8 of the Arbitration Procedure Code, and the Article 3919 of 
the Civil Procedure Code give the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation 
the right to overturn a lower court decision if it contradicts other established 
decisions on similar matters [1; 4]. Normative acts in the form of explanations 
of the Plenum of the Supreme Court are binding on all lower courts which is 
confirmed by the 1993 Russian Constitution (Articles 126 and 127) [6].
There is following generally classification of precedents in Russian law: (a) 
precedents of interpretation and gap-filling; (b) precedents arising out of judi-
cial review; (c) precedents of discretion [22, p. 117]. Precedents of gap-filling 
and interpritation are both most common in Russian legal system. Precedents 
of judicial review have been encountered in practice and seem to be expanding 
through the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. The exercise of judicial 
discretion is widely spread but it is not binding as a precedent, that is a piece 
of proposal which are given by the higher courts.
The higher court papers (the Supreme Court and the formerSupreme Arbi-
trazh Court of the Russian Federation, whose papers are still enforceable) are 
presented in the following legal forms: (a) Decision of the Court, (b) Resolu-
tion of the Plenum of the Court, (c) Informational Letter from the Presidium of 
the Court, (d) Resolution of the Presidium of the Court, (e) Declaration of the 
Court. All of this ruling have immediate value for the purpose of legal analysis 
and reasoning and show the significant role that precedent plays in the Civil 
Law system [8; p. 75; 5, p. 152; 2, p. 38; 7, p. 10].
3. The term ‘analogy’ in the Common Law system. In broad terms,reason-
ing by analogy is a legal reasoning when an early case being followed in a later 
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case because the later case is similar to the earlier one. Arguments by analogy 
are closed to the arguments from precedent and compliment them in two ways: 
(a) they are used when the facts of a case do not fall within the ratio of any 
precedent, for the purpose of adapt the result to that in the analogical case; and 
(b) they are used when the facts of a case do fall within the ratio of a precedent, 
for the purpose of distinguishing the case at hand from the precedent. It is ob-
vious that the legal force both arguments from analogy and from precedent is 
different. According to stare decisis a precedent should be followed unless the 
court has the power to overrule the earlier decision. In contraposition to prece-
dent, arguments from analogy distinguish in their strengths: from very ‘close’ 
analogies (which strongly follow a result) to more ‘remote’ analogies (which 
weakly follow a result). Analogy does not bind,it must be considered along 
with other reasons for the purpose of reach a result. It means that an analogy is 
rejected in one case does not preclude raising the analogy in a different case.It 
also frequently happens that there is more than one case that arguably applies 
to the case at hand. In that circumstance, courts that reason by analogy must 
determine which of the previous cases is most similar to the case to be decided.
Two guestions may be determined by analogical reasoning. Firstly, how 
can a decision-maker identify the ‘common characterisation’ between the case 
at hand and the analogous one, in other words when are two cases ‘similar’ 
for the purposes of analogy? Secondly, what type of justificatory force does 
the common characterisation provide? On the first question, it is obvious that 
no two cases are identical in every respect, at the same time not every case is 
thought to provide an analogy. For that reason the question that has to be an-
swered iswhat limits or directs the selection of analogies? What kind of reason 
does an analogy provide for deciding the case at hand in the same way?
The existence of an analogy depends on the justification for the analogical 
decision. The facts of a case may do not fall within the ratio of any precedent, 
and thus the court is not bound by the precedent. By contrast, arguments from 
analogy provide when the justification for the earlier decision apply to the later 
case. It should be noted that underlying principles may have influence with 
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the legal reasoning by analogy. A body of cases can be examined to determine 
which principle explains and justifies those decisions. A principle that makes 
best sense of a series of cases or aspects of legal doctrine can have some jus-
tificatory force even though the cases or doctrines are imperfect.
The use of analogies in law provides a compensate function for some of 
the indeterminacy which flows from fragmented materials and the pluralism of 
decision-makers. That a close analogy exists usually provides a good reason 
for deciding the case the same way, since it renders the law more replicable 
than it would otherwise be. At the same time, analogies can be defeated by 
other considerations if there is a good basis for distinguishing, or if its merits 
are too weak.
4. The term ‘analogy’ in the Civil Law system. Analogy in the Civil Law 
is considered another way then in the Common Law. Particularly in the Civil 
Law tradition legal theory differentiates between statutory analogy (analogia 
legis) and legal analogy (analogia iuris). Traditionally, statutory analogy is 
considered an interpretive argument, which refers to the application of a legal 
norm regulating a case to an essentially similar case for which no legal norm 
exists. In contrast, legal analogy is used for the purpose of filling in gaps where 
the statutory analogy does not provide a solution. In these cases, the analogy 
does not applying according to norms, but to the so-called “general principle 
of law”. 
The Civil Law legal system often allows the gaps in the law. Take for exam-
ple Russian legal system. According to the Civil Code (the Article 6) in cases 
when the relations are not directly regulated by legislation or by an agreement 
between the parties, while the custom that would be applicable to them does 
not exist, and if this is not in contradiction with their substance, the civil legis-
lation will be applied, which regulates similar relations (statutory analogy). 
If it is impossible to apply the similar law, the rights and duties of the par-
ties will be defined, proceeding from the general principles and the meaning of 
the civil legislation (legal analogy), and also from the requirements of honesty, 
reasonableness and justice [3].
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In general terms, ‘legal gap’ means the lack of a definite legal rule for the 
regulation of certain relations. It is obvious that the legislator cannot predeter-
mine all the cases that may arise, on the other; it should be taken into consid-
eration that life itself undergoes change. However, the subjective factor also 
has a role in the existence of legal gaps. Actually, the issue of the lacking legal 
rule is decided exclusively within the framework of legislation and on the pre-
mise that positive law, through its principles,constitutes an accomplished and 
all-encompassing system, which can give an answer to anyspecific problem.
For that reason the legislation does not aim at giving a definition, but, rather, at 
showing what is to be done, when it is established that the law has gaps.
Conclusion
Distinctions between the Common Law system and the Civil Law system 
are vital. In this connection, both institutes analogy and precedent have sub-
stantial differences in legal reasoning across the Civil Law and Common Law 
jurisdictions.
Precedent in the Common Law vs. Precedent in the Civil Law.
1. Different significance. Precedent is a central part of legal reasoning in 
the Common Law: since courts are bound to apply the law, and since earlier 
decisions have practical authority over the content of the law, later courts are 
bound to follow the decisions of earlier cases. In contrast, precedent are not 
formally recognized as a source of law in the Civil Law. The decisions of the 
courts playing merely a concurrent role in settling the content of the law. 
2. Focus on holdings. In Civil Law systems, there is no tradition of differen-
tiating systematically in connection with a precedent opinion between ratio de-
cidendi and obiter dicta – between holding and dictum – as in the Common Law.
3. Focus on distinguishing. No approach of distinguishing precedents in 
the Civil Law countries. By contrast, distinguishing has long been something 
of a high art among practitioners and judges in the Common Law countries.
4. Statements of facts. In general, Civil Law decisions do not include de-
tailed statements of facts, as distinct from the Common Law papers.
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5. Contextualization of rules. Rules in the Common Law are contextualized 
within and emerge from fact situations. In most Civil Law systems rules are 
usualy the primary determinants of their ultimate scope (statutes, codes, ect.)
6. Subsequent court departures. Anessential difference concerns the liberty 
of even lower courts to depart from a single higher-court precedent, or even 
from a line of several precedents, that is used to the Civil Law.
Analogy in the Common Law vs. Analogy in the Civil Law.
1. Different significance. The gaps in the law are often allowed in the Civil 
Law, thus the courts are bound by analogy in that cases where applying statutes 
is not enough or merely impossible. Courts are not bound by analogy in the 
Common Law, they often apply it for argumentation. 
2. Focus on purpose. In the Civil Law legal system analogy applies for the 
purpose of filling gaps in the law, while analogy also applies in order to distin-
guishing the case at hand from the precedent in the Common Law. 
3. Different types. It is widely spread both statutory analogy (analogia le-
gis) and legal analogy (analogia iuris) in the Civil Law that does not exists in 
the Common Law.
Finally, terminological and meaning differences of precedent and analogy 
in the Common Law and the Civil Law,that have been described above, have 
both appliedand theoretical significance. It may help in the comparative legal 
studies and cross-linguistic researches and also when applying such institutes 
especially in the area of comparative law.
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